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ABSTRACT
Two traditional models of global expansion were evaluated in an exploratory
effort to explain the globalization patterns of emerging high-technology
companies. Extensive field interviews were conducted with 19 Massachusetts-
based companies that supply software or peripheral products for desktop
computing to explore: their timing and aggressiveness in entering markets
outside of North America; their structures and patterns for expansion; and
their success.
Sample companies report non-domestic revenues ranging from 6% to 58% of
their totals. Most companies achieved 10% non-domestic revenues with only
modest efforts, although companies supplying communications products
subject to government regulation faced much higher penetration barriers.
Globalization success, defined here as how quickly a company achieves
substantial percentage of revenues from non-domestic markets, is strongly
linked to how aggressively senior management allocates internal resources to
developing an overseas business model that approximates the company's U.S.
model. The varied adoption rates of the desktop computing platforms
themselves also affected globalization. The results support an integrated
model of globalization that combines elements of the Vernon product cycle
and Rugman internationalization process models.
This work was prepared with support from the David and Lindsay Morgenthaler Fund for
Entrepreneurship Research.
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Globalization Patterns of Emerging High Technology Companies:
An Exploratory Analysis of Desktop Computing
Traditional evolutionary explanations of global involvement attribute a
company's behavior either to product life-cycle effects or to the gradual reduction in
perceived market expansion risk. In contrast the authors argue that global expansion
patterns are intimately linked to a combination of external and internal forces:
1. the product/market space provides the opportunity for globalization;
2. senior management expectations and responsiveness to opportunity
provide the means for globalization.
Aspects of the global market for certain classes of emerging technology products tend
to accelerate global exposure, thus permitting firms specifically to address
globalization issues earlier in their histories, and at a much smaller size, than is
traditionally considered appropriate. Those firms that fail either to recognize early
global opportunities or to respond to globalization pressures by allocating appropriate
resources to the development of effective structures, underperform their more
globally aggressive rivals.
Two Models of Globalization
The traditional literature, developed primarily through study of large,
multinational manufacturing companies, contains two contrasting views of how
firms globalize. Raymond Vernon, in explaining the rapid growth and geographic
spread of U.S.-based multi-nationals (MNCs) during the decades following World
War II, framed globalization in the context of the product cycle. Initially, domestic
(U.S.) market conditions caused a firm with appropriate capital, engineering and
labor resource to respond by creating a new product for the home market. As the
product matured, it was transferred to overseas markets via wholly-owned
subsidiaries. Eventually, as the product became standardized or a commodity, all of
the production would take place in lower-cost overseas facilities, often owned by
third-party licensees, and the MNC would import foreign production even to satisfy
its own U.S. market needs.1
Thirty years later Vernon noted, "...certain conditions of that period are gone. For
one thing, the leading MNCs have now developed global networks of subsidiaries;
for another, the U.S. market is no longer unique among national markets either in
size or factor cost configuration. It seems plausible to assume that the product cycle
1 Raymond Vernon. "International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle".
Quarterly Journal of Economics. Volume 80, May 1966.
2
will be less useful..."2 He does, however, expect that "...strong traces of the sequence
are likely to remain. One such trace is likely to be provided by the innovative
activities of smaller firms...as they move from home-based innovation to the
possibility of exports and ultimately of overseas investment."3
In the second approach, Rugman et al. utilized the concepts of transaction
costs and risk in outlining "...the typical process by which a firm producing a
standardized product will seek to involve itself in a foreign market. In this
internationalization process the firm regards foreign markets as risky, since these
markets are unknown to it. In terms of the special costs of doing business across
national boundaries...the firm faces export marketing costs. To avoid such
information costs and risks, its strategy is to go abroad at a slow and cautious pace,
often using the services of specialists in international trade outside the firm. Over
time, familiarity with the foreign environment will reduce the information costs
and help to alleviate the perceived risks of foreign involvement." 4 The Rugman et
al. model suggests that firms follow a globalization path that increases depth of
Figure 1. Rugman's Internationalization Process
Depth of
Involvement
Foreign direct
investment
Local packaging
and/or assembly
Export through network of sales reps,
distributors, or sales subsidiaries
Export via third-party trading company
License (except when there is risk of
loss of technological advantage)
Time
2 Raymond Vernon. "The Product Cycle Hypothesis in a New International Environment", in H.
Wortzel and L. Wortzel, eds., Strategic Management of Multinational Corporations: The Essentials.
New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1985, p.
3 Ibid., p.
4 A.M. Rugman, D.J. Lecraw, and L.D. Booth. International Business: Firm and Environment. New York,
NY: McGraw-Hill, 1985.
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internal involvement over time, as in Figure 15.
Our hypothesis is both more simple and direct, integrating aspects of the
Vernon and Rugman models. From Vernon we perceive that the condition of the
product and its market, not limited however to its life cycle stage, determines an
opportunity space for global sales. From Rugman we acknowledge differences
among firms in regard to their anticipated transaction costs and risks of globalization
and argue that some firms are better prepared to seize global opportunities.
Therefore, we see globalization as the combined outcome of these external and
internal forces. The two traditional models will be explored concurrent with
examination of our hypothesized integration of Vernon-related external opportunity
generation combined with Rugman-based internal opportunity capture.
The Global Desktop Computing Market
Michael Porter has defined the characteristics of a global industry as "... an
industry in which a firm's competitive position in one country is significantly
affected by its position in other countries."6 He and Ted Levitt refer to the declining
real cost of transportation and huge improvements in worldwide communications
and travel infrastructure as major factors contributing to globalization. Levitt cites
"... high-tech products, where the universal language of customers and users
facilitates standardization"7 as among those especially likely to converge quickly
towards global competition. The multi-hundred billion dollar worldwide market for
high technology desktop computing products-workstations, personal computers,
and associated software and peripherals-certainly appears to fit nicely into the
Levitt-Porter settings. Increasing competition in industries ranging from
automobiles to banking has created similar end-user segments for high value-added
computing power in most corners of the globe. Indeed, companies such as Apple,
Microsoft, Lotus, Aldus, Sun, Novell, Compaq, IBM, Hewlett-Packard, Toshiba, and
NEC compete throughout the globe with products whose core benefits and basic form
and functionality are easily recognizable, regardless of the geographic location of the
user.
Several aspects of the desktop computing industries make their globalization
patterns particularly interesting. First, with the exception of a few electronics giants
(e.g. the last four above), most of the key players in these industries are not
5 Ibid., p.
6 Michael E. Porter. "Competition in Global Industries: A Conceptual Framework", in Michael Porter,
ed., Competition in Global Industries. Boston, MA: Harvard Graduate School of Business
Administration, 1986, p.
7 Theodore Levitt. "The Globalization of Markets". Harvard Business Review. Volume 61, Number 3,
May-June 1983.
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traditional diversified multi-nationals. Rather they are young U.S.-based firms that
have exploded from ground zero to global scale and prominence by exploiting
pioneering products specifically aimed at these emerging markets. Furthermore, the
value-to-weight and value-to-volume ratios of products in these segments are very
high relative to traditional manufacturing industries, so that transportation costs can
potentially be absorbed by needy end-users. This combination of young, non-
traditional firms and easily-traded goods might be expected to result in globalization
patterns unlike those of more traditional goods.
Second, the rapid convergence within these markets to standard architecture
and platforms-UNIX, MS-DOS, Windows, Macintosh-seems to have created an
environment uniquely supportive of the global penetration of new products.
Finally, although "...success...requires a search for sales opportunities in
similar segments across the globe in order to achieve the economies of scale
necessary to compete,"8 much of the ongoing innovation in software and peripheral
products within these markets continues to be driven by tiny start-up companies that
might not ordinarily be considered appropriate in resources and scale to attack global
markets. Thus the desktop computing industries seem good candidates for analysis
to explore the current applicability of the traditional models of globalization.
Sample Selection and Possible Bias
In order to facilitate an exploratory field test of alternative models for
globalization, a population of target companies was defined to be:
· Massachusetts-based (for proximity)
* Independent firms (not divisions of other companies)
* Manufacturers of software or peripherals for PCs or workstations
As this study was intended to be exploratory only, we selected a convenience
sample of these companies with the goal of providing examples of a range of
products, company sizes, and company business models. Candidate companies were
identified from several sources, including recent articles in local magazines and
journals, participants in an export-related meeting of the Massachusetts Software
Council, and various computer-industry listings in the Massachusetts Technology
Resource Guide.9 The goal for sample size was set at approximately 20 companies.
Thirty companies were solicited to participate and full structured interviews were
conducted with 20 companies. One company's data were subsequently excluded, as a
large fraction of its international growth had been achieved by acquiring other
8 Levitt, op. cit.
9 CorpTech. Massachusetts Technology Resource Guide. Wobum, MA: 1993.
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product lines and companies, making its experience not comparable to the rest of the
sample.
Clearly, the 19 companies ultimately included do not represent a scientific
sample of the population of U.S.-based emerging companies serving desktop
computing markets. Two possible biases must be kept specifically in mind when
considering the results of this work. First, as all of the companies were
Massachusetts-based, regional characteristics of product and business models as well
as of international behavior may tend to cluster company patterns more closely than
in a national sample. Also, a number of companies originally solicited for inclusion
declined to participate, raising the possibility of a self-selection bias, particularly if
those companies declined due to internal perception that their global activities were
too limited or producing substandard results.
Because of the narrowly-defined nature of the sample companies, data for
establishing the magnitude of any biases were quite difficult to find. A study recently
published by the Bank of Boston found that the rate of export growth by all New
England businesses trailed the rest of the country every year from 1988 to 1992, except
in 1989.10 A recent survey by Inc. magazine found that of the companies on the 1993
"Inc. 500" list of rapidly growing small companies (median 1992 sales of $5.8 million),
38% did some international business, with revenues from international markets
(including Canada) averaging 15% of the company total.11 Finally, CorpTech, a
provider of information on technology-based companies, found that while most
technology manufacturers in its New England data-base did some international
business, only 11.3% derive more than 25% of net revenues from international
activities, another 11% have between 10-25%, and 30-35% of the companies generate
less than 10%. More than 30% of the companies in its database report no
international trading activity at all.12 While none of the above reports provides a
particularly good match for this study's sample, nor any insight into how the process
of globalization might relate to a company's age or maturity, at least they provide
points of reference for comparison with the sample companies.
Of the 10 companies that were approached but declined to participate, six had
previously supplied data to CorpTech. Two of these companies had export revenues
under 10% of their total, two were in the range of 10-25%, and two had reported over
25% non-domestic revenue. The other companies that refused to be interviewed
were privately held and indicated they never released any information as a matter of
policy. No obvious bias seems reflected in these 10 non-participants.
10 Bank of Boston. "New England Exports: Where Do We Go From Here?" Boston, MA: 1994.
11 Inc. "Who's Going Global?" Volume 16, Number 3, March 1994.
12 Data from CorpTech, Woburn, MA.
6
Research Methodology
Data were gathered by personal interviews lasting between 30 and 90 minutes.
Interviews were held either in person, or, in a few cases, by telephone. Each
interviewee was a senior employee of the target company, usually currently holding
or having held direct responsibility for international activities.
The interviews were conducted as structured historical accounts, in which the
respondents were invited to describe their companies' founding history and
domestic business model, the initial impetus for entering markets outside of North
America, and the subsequent story of international expansion activities. Each
respondent was also asked to provide specific quantitative data on revenues, growth,
staffing, and global performance. The structured questions were designed to aid in
the synthesis of patterns and benchmarks by measuring:
* At what size and age companies initiated globalization activities
* What initiated global activities
· Which markets were entered or avoided
* What structures were utilized
* What internal and external factors most affected performance
Data from the study are presented below, primarily in a descriptive manner,
noting where appropriate the possible ties to the three competing globalization
hypotheses described above. Implications of the data are pulled together in the
Discussion and Conclusions section of this paper. Although the sample is small at
n=19, Pearson chi-square statistical analyses were performed on a number of the
testable inferences. The resulting probabilities of a Type 1 error have been computed
and are reported in parentheses following the applicable statement. Given the small
sample size, the relationships should be considered as only indicative rather than
statistically validated. The Appendix contains information on the detailed
characteristics of each numbered firm along with background explanations of these
characteristics.
Readiness to Capture Global Opportunities
The sampled U.S. companies embody various states of internal management
readiness to pursue global markets. Pre-globalization readiness is evaluated along
two primary dimensions: the presence or absence of staff with either global business
experience or exposure to international environments; and the strategic importance
that senior management attached to competing in global markets. One recent survey
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of 20 high-tech companies found that an "ideal salesperson" included among his/her
traits "multilingual and likes to travel".13
The start-up global skill-level was extremely poor throughout the sample. At
the time of domestic release of their initial products, only three of the sample
companies had staff members with substantial prior professional experience dealing
with global markets, and in one of those companies the highly skilled individual
was initially allocated solely to domestic activities. Thus, from a Rugman
perspective most of these firms would be presumed to anticipate high transaction
costs and/or risks in global undertakings.
The strategic importance nominally attached to global markets by senior
management varies within the sample. Their global sensitivity clearly changed over
time (p=0.01), as seven of the eight companies that released their initial products
during 1988 or later report having specific global intentions at domestic release. Only
three of the 11 companies releasing products prior to 1988 report having a specific
globalization strategy at product release, although seven of them describe the
company as aware that markets outside of North America might ultimately be
important, and four of those report a specific expectation of eventually targeting
overseas markets. A broader analysis of strategic and promotional factors affecting
high-tech sales growth during 1984-1988 neglected to even mention the words
"global" or "internationational" in their data-gathering instrument. l4
Interestingly, despite presumed differences in levels of managerial
sophistication, companies funded by professional Venture Capital investors were no
more likely to attach early strategic importance to global markets than the others
(significant difference rejected by a Pearson chi-square test due to probability of a Type
1 error of exactly p=0.50). The only product category showing even a tendency toward
a distinct pattern was Programming/Development software, as 4 of the 5 companies
in this category report early expectations that global markets might be important, in
contrast with 6 of the remaining 14 firms (p=0.15).
The most important factor determining the attitude towards global market
opportunity seems to be the makeup of founders and early management: 9 of the 10
companies which specifically expected global markets to become important include
in the management team someone who had worked previously in or with a
company that did substantial business in global markets, or who had traveled or
lived overseas and felt comfortable considering global activities. None of the 9
1 3 A. Coskun Samli, Gregory P. Wirth, and James R. Wills Jr. "High-Tech Firms Must Get More Out of
Their International Sales Efforts". Industrial Marketing Management. Volume 23, 1994, 333-342.
14 Kenneth Traynor and Susan Traynor. "The Efficacy of Strategic and Promotional Factors on the Sales
Growth of High-Tech Firms". IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management. Volume 41, Number 2,
May 1994, 126-134.
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companies lacking such founder experience attached initial importance to global
markets (p<0.0001).
Impetus for Global Expansion
Triggers to begin international market activity came from four external
sources: Domestic customers with overseas facilities; domestic distribution partners;
overseas distribution partners; and overseas customers. All four external "pulls"
represent opportunity forces that are essentially unrelated to stage of product cycle.
The fifth impetus for expansion was a proactive decision from internal company
management.
Domestic Customer Pull The global needs of large multi-national companies
who are already domestic customers might be expected to be a major driver for
initiating overseas activities by their suppliers. Surprisingly, only one company
(Software Programming Tools #2) reports that domestic customer transfer was an
important initial consideration.
Domestic Distribution Partner Pull Only two companies (#6, #8) report that a
domestic distribution or trading partner was responsible for initiating contact with
overseas markets. None of the three companies which had important OEM partners
was first pulled to international markets by their OEM partners.
Overseas Distribution Partner Pull Nine of the 19 companies in the sample,
and seven of the 11 which released products prior to 1988, indicate that unsolicited
contact by potential overseas distribution partners caused the company's first activity
outside of North America. All of these companies were initially contacted by
distribution partners from one or more European countries, but only one of the
partners initiating these contacts solicited responsibility for pan-European master
distribution. Only one of the nine companies (#13, Network Hardware for
Macintosh) reports simultaneous interest from Japan, and that was for a product
introduced in 1988.
Much of this early distributor contact took place at domestic industry trade
shows to which overseas distributors sent representatives specifically searching for
new products. Articles or advertisements placed by manufacturers in specialized
domestic technical or trade journals with overseas subscribers also provided
visibility to potential overseas distribution contacts.
Overseas Customer Pull Three of the companies in the sample, all of whom
had introduced domestically prior to 1985, were pulled into international activity in
response to specific interest from European end-customers.
Proactive Internal Push This impetus represents a departure from the others
in that internal company management is the driver, not a respondent to external
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forces. Seven of the companies in the sample, and six of the eight that introduced
during or after 1988, describe a proactive internal decision to begin exploring
overseas markets as the trigger for activity. Not surprisingly, these are primarily
those companies that, at the moment of domestic product release, report having
specific interest in eventually exploiting global markets.
Age and Size at Initiation of Global Activities
The company's age is defined here as the years a product was available
domestically prior to international activity beginning, a surrogate for stage of product
life cycle. Despite the scarcity of skills and firm plans, most of the companies began
N Timing of First Overseas Activity
9 During 1st year of domestic release
7 During 2nd year after domestic release
3 More than 2 years after domestic release
doing some level of overseas business within two years of domestic product release.
Those companies with specific internal management expectations of global market
penetration typically began proactively seeking out opportunity within the first year
(p=0.04), while the others responded to overseas channel pull as it developed. All
three of the companies taking more than two years to initiate overseas activities
introduced their products prior to 1988.
The product categories show little statistically significant differentiation in
either the timing or source of the initial impetus to serve overseas markets. As most
of the companies initiated global activity within two years of product shipment, they
tended to be fairly small at the time.
N Company Revenues # Employees
5 < $1 Million <10
11 2-5 Million 11-50
3 > 10 Million >100
Globalization Patterns
The global activities of the sample companies following their first exposure to
overseas market opportunities can be classified along two basic dimensions:
territorial scope and internalization. Territorial Scope describes the nature of
geographic market coverage and expansion. Internalization refers to how much of a
company's global activities were internalized, and how aggressively.
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Territorial Scope
The expansion patterns of the sample companies range from simultaneous
rollout in all major European and Asian markets to supporting a slim portfolio of
overseas markets. Four sets of factors are seen to limit or affect the territorial
expansion programs of the sample companies: Regulatory; platform; local market;
and familiarity.
Regulatory Factors Four companies initially introduced
communications/networking hardware products that connected directly to
telephone lines, and thus were subject to regulatory approval in each country in
which they were sold. In particular, entry into France, Germany, and the U.K., which
would normally be expected to be major markets for such products, required
substantial incremental engineering investment and intervention with local
governments. In each company's case, the impetus to enter a given market was the
result of an overseas distribution partner's request, and was evaluated as a distinct
incremental investment. Local competitors with more experience in meeting home-
country specifications were also able to develop products, and thus the global market
was fragmented into individual local markets.
Scandinavia, Italy, and Japan were the only countries to show up as a major
overseas market for at least three of the four companies in this category. The only
company reporting a high world-wide market share (65%) in a particular regulated
product-line was Company #11, and that was for its Macintosh line only.
Platform Factors As each product operates on one or more computing
platform, the potential for territorial expansion for any company is inherently
limited by the penetration of appropriate platforms in non-domestic markets.
Companies supplying the Macintosh platform were basically able to introduce
their products to all markets where the Macintosh had strong penetration by
broadcasting the product's availability at specialized industry trade shows and via
trade journals. All of the companies with Macintosh products list Japan, U.K., Italy,
and Scandinavia as consistently strong overseas markets. With the exception of the
one company with a regulated hardware product (#11), France was a strong market
for Macintosh products as well. These company interviewees indicate that their
overseas presence maps closely with the Macintosh installed base, and that their
competitive share in overseas markets maps closely with the domestic market.
It is somewhat difficult to separate IBM-PC platform factors from regulatory
factors, since three of the PC products are regulated network hardware. The only
clear platform effect is the absence of Japan from PC platform companies' major
markets, due to the huge installed base of non-IBM-compatible NEC personal
computers. U.K., France, Germany, Benelux were consistently strong markets, with
11
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Australia, Scandinavia, and Asia also identified as receptive to PC platform
companies.
Workstation platform penetration overseas seems to track advanced-market
expectations very well, as most of the sample workstation product companies
introduced in European, Japanese, Australian, and Asia/Pacific markets nearly
simultaneously, and the U.K., France, Germany, Japan were at the top of each
company's major market listings. Athough the platform is well-established, Market
Factors were still observed in certain product categories.
Market Factors Two distinct kinds of local-market factors were observed.
Product Localization, the practice of tailoring products to meet specific local market
conditions (as opposed to government regulation), was nearly absent. Aside from
changing power supplies and engineering the product to meet increasingly universal
safety standards, the unregulated networking hardware group did no product
tailoring whatsoever. Most vendors of software products entered each new overseas
market initially with a standard U.S. domestic product. Half of them eventually
engineered some level of product localization, usually limited to supporting
European and/or Japanese character sets. Nearly all companies in the sample had
arranged for local language translation of key marketing materials for major
markets. The two markets for which such localization seemed especially important
were France and Japan, and many of the lead distribution partners in these markets
took the burden upon themselves of early language localization.
The second market factor-Market Maturity-is less about customer
convenience and more about fundamental product usage patterns. Although
companies supplying Programming/Development Software and
Technical/Engineering Software (largely for the workstation platform) experienced
fairly easy simultaneous rollout and acceptance in major markets, the experience of
companies supplying advanced networking products was quite different. Each of the
three most advanced network system management software companies had great
difficulty selling product successfully in Japan until at least two years after initiating
European business development. None of the three lists Japan as being in its top
five overseas markets. Similarly, three of the four advanced
networking/internetworking hardware companies (the exception being the
Macintosh product) report that successful Japanese market entry lagged Europe by at
least two years. Although three of these four companies do list Japan as a top five
overseas market now, all indicate the Japanese demand as concentrated around
relatively simple network activities such as printer sharing and e-mail rather than
the strategic management of network operations and distributed knowledge which
has become such a hot topic in the U.S. market.
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Familiarity Factors The final factor limiting a company's territorial expansion
manifests itself in the order of geographic market expansion. Most companies'
product introduction strategies appropriately track the penetration of platforms or
the readiness of markets, although some of the lag associated with entry into Japan
may reflect hesitation due to the perception of unfamiliarity. Eight companies
entered Japan more than one year after establishing European market channels, and
Japan is the only market in which a joint venture (one company) or a third-party
consultant intermediary (one company) were utilized as primary long-term market
entry structures.
Familiarity seems to impact most heavily on the decision of where to invest
in overseas staffing, which resulted in several cases of using the U.K. as a European
beachhead. Interestingly, most of the companies initially basing European regional
management responsibility in the U.K. have since moved regional headquarters into
France, Germany or the Benelux countries.
Similarly, of the four companies that both list Japan as a top market and have
some direct employees overseas, only two have direct employees stationed in Japan.
Four companies have direct staff in Australia and six companies have direct staff in
the relatively cosmopolitan cities of Hong Kong or Singapore.
The regulatory, platform and most of the market factors discussed above are
supportive indicators of external forces of global opportunities. Some elements of
market (i.e., Japanese market lag) relate to Vernon's model and the familiarity issues
do reflect Rugman's concerns for risk perception.
Internationalization
The sample companies display several distinct operating modes representing
different levels of internationalization of their global activities. Most of the
companies progressed through one or more modes during the period under study.
The modes of internationalization, as well as the initial mode employed by the
sample companies entering global activities, are shown in Figure 2, paralleling the
Figure 1 presentation of Rugman's model.
Reliance on Third-Party Experts (Mode A) Three companies (#3, 6, 8) initially
allocated most of the management responsibility for overseas market development
to U.S.-based, third-party distribution partners, thus limiting their internalization of
any knowledge of overseas markets. None of these companies surpassed 10% non-
domestic revenues while operating in this mode. Of the 11 companies introducing
products prior to 1988, seven of them hired the services of an outside international
trade consultant to help guide global startup, even though only three of them
utilized these resources as official distribution partners. Of the eight companies in
13
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Figure 2. Initial Modes of Internationalization by the Sample Companies
A
Depth of
Involvement
Home-Based Activity Overseas Activity
E) Overseas
# of companies entering Packaging/Assembly
overseas markets in mode
D) Overseas Marketing,
11 Sales, Support Staff
C) Active Home-Based Management
3 NUB) Reactive Home-Based Export
A) Passive Export, via third-party trading company
Time
the post-1987 period, in contrast, only two employed any third-party experts.
The perceived value of international trade consultant expertise had clearly declined
over time (p<0.10), as companies tended to utilize the advice of their own industry
contacts rather than of international market experts. Several report relying heavily
on information provided by major platform suppliers (Apple, Sun, Novell). This
seems to indicate a fundamental difference in the perception of information-related
risk by companies that felt they were entering a market defined by the global reach of
the platform rather than the individual characteristics of local market end-users.
Japan, as discussed above, was seen to be particularly different, and several
companies report seeking specialized third-party advice regarding appropriate entry
strategy or partner selection.
Reactive Home-Based Supportfor Overseas Distribution Activities (Mode B)
In this mode, companies typically had been directly solicited by overseas distribution
partners, and had agreed to supply them with product in an arms-length, limited-
support arrangement. No senior domestic-based management personnel allocated
more than 50% of their time to the support of overseas activities. Although in a few
cases representatives from the sample companies traveled overseas during the sign-
up period, or to support specific installation activity, travel was generally light.
14
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Five of the sample companies entered global activity in this mode, and the
three that had begun by relying on third-party domestic distribution also transitioned
into reactive direct support for overseas partners. Of these eight companies, the two
supplying primarily the Macintosh market (#11, HW for Comm/NW-R; #13, HW
for Comm/NW-U) quickly developed non-domestic revenues greater than 25% and
10% of their respective totals. The third company with a Macintosh-platform
version of its core product in its line (#8, SW for Tech/Engineering) also managed to
surpass 10% of total revenues while operating in this mode. None of the other five
companies, four of which served largely PC-based networking applications and one
of which supplied software development tools, surpassed 10%. The anomaly in the
Macintosh market was attributed by all three companies to the unusually high level
of sophistication and self-sufficiency displayed by the few, specialized, Macintosh-
platform distribution partners that have developed in overseas markets where the
Macintosh has had strong penetration (U.K., France, Japan).
Active Home-Based Management of Distribution Activities (Mode C) This
mode of operation marks a departure from the prior modes in that senior company
management identified overseas activities as worthy of internal resource allocation.
As is demonstrated statistically in the later section on Globalization Performance, the
investment of resources that had the highest impact was the dedication of a home-
based manager to support and champion global business development. In three
cases, substantial (but not 100%) personal attention from very senior company
management substituted for a dedicated manager. In allocating a specific internal
management person to global business development, early-moving companies
seemed to select staff members with substantial experience selling their kind of
products, while prior international business development experience was considered
desirable but less important. Several of the individuals who successfully led
globalization efforts on behalf of their companies had no specific international skills
prior to taking on the coordination role. Late-moving companies, or those which
perceived their globalization efforts to be proceeding poorly, tended to go outside and
hire new staff with a proven track record of global success.
Other internal resources allocated to global activities by companies operating
in this active mode include heavy travel expense, some limited product-tailoring to
fit local market requirements, and moderate levels of umbrella marketing expenses
in support of overseas distribution partners.
11 of the 19 companies in the sample began their global activities in this fairly
aggressive operating mode. The products supported by this more aggressive global
stance from the beginning tended to be higher-priced, more complex products whose
domestic distribution model were either VAR, Direct Telesales, or Direct Field Sales.
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All eight companies that had previously operated less aggressively eventually
transitioned into this mode as well.
Companies that operated in this mode tended to develop what one staff
member called the "Primary Partner Model," in which, for each major overseas
market (e.g., France, Japan) one distribution partner would be designated as the
primary market interface. This partner would typically have responsibility for
coordinating local marketing and sales activity, and managing additional tiers of
distribution within its own market area, as well as providing ancillary support to
nearby satellite markets (e.g., Spain relative to France).
Local Management lOwnership of Overseas Distribution Activities (Mode D)
While dedicating domestic management resources seems to have been fairly easy for
the sample companies, the decision to hire or place direct employees in overseas
locations remained a major risk hurdle. Not even the most aggressive companies
hired direct overseas employees to manage distribution activities, prior to achieving
10% of total revenues from non-domestic sources and total company revenues in
excess of $3 million. 12 companies eventually supported varying levels of staff in
overseas markets, including three companies that entered direct local market
management by acquiring their primary European or U.K. distribution partners.
It is worth noting here the experience of the one company that was eventually
excluded from the data analysis. This company was a supplier of modems and other
regulated communications products, founded in the early 1970s, that had begun to
supply to the desktop computing platforms in the early 1980s. It had largely avoided
contact with global markets until the late 1980s, at which time its management
recognized the global nature of the market for its products. Uniquely among all of
the companies contacted for this study, this one company's entry into global markets
was primarily via the direct acquisition of a U.K.-based manufacturer of networking
products. Headquarters for all non-domestic activities was subsequently consolidated
into the former U.K. company, and the U.S. head office performed almost no global
business development activities. This company was so different from the rest of the
sample, each of which had entered overseas markets with a domestic product, that
we excluded it from the analyses.
The level of investment in overseas staff varies according to the companies'
distribution model objectives. In most cases, the first step in going direct was to
internalize the regional management and marketing coordination activities that had
been performed previously by major market primary partners.
Three of the five companies that utilized VARs as the primary domestic
channel invested in overseas regional management staff to coordinate support for
local VAR channels, while the only distributor-model company to put local
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employees in place is doing so in support of a gradual migration towards more VAR-
channel activity.
Six of the seven companies whose primary domestic distribution model was
Direct Field Sales hired local employees in overseas markets within four years of
beginning non-domestic activities. In contrast, none of the four Direct Telesales
companies invested in any overseas management structure. This result is perhaps
not too surprising, as in the latter model a core of home-based telephone/fax support
personnel can provide the appropriately high level of technical assistance to overseas
distribution partners more efficiently than individuals distributed to each of the
major markets. If, however, as in the Direct Field Sales Model, closing the sale with
the end-user relies heavily on the real time, on-site performance of local technical
salespeople and the availability of local support staff, a major investment in overseas
employees has high leverage.
Direct Global Investment in Other Value-Chain Activities (Mode E) The
distribution-related overseas employees and offices typically have responsibility for
sales, some local technical support, and local implementation of corporate-driven
marketing campaigns. Only two of the sample companies invested in overseas
product assembly, and both of those investments are single plants established by
hardware companies trying to be at the source of inexpensive components and low-
cost labor. All other hardware companies in the sample still contract for components
on the world market and perform final assembly in Massachusetts. All expect to
continue to use the home plant as the manufacturing base for some time to come.
Similarly, in software only two of the companies have entered into formal
local market republishing arrangements, either via direct local subsidiary or a
distribution partner. The other software companies publish even tailored versions
of software at home and export them.
Globalization Performance
Each of the companies in the sample has followed a unique globalization path,
with differing results. In addition, while several of the sample companies cited
proprietary market research that they are utilizing for internal measurement of
global opportunity, in general they were unwilling to share the confidential data on
their specific market segments, making objective benchmarking more difficult.
Finally, while the companies were quite open with information relating to revenues,
very few companies were willing to share profitability information specifically
related to their overseas business.
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We first develop a rough anchor measure of the global market opportunity for
desktop computing software and peripherals, and then assess the implications of
actual company performance.
The Global Market for Computing Equipment
Several different kinds of market information were considered in developing
a rough proxy for the global market profile for desktop computing products during
the period under study. The 1985 geographic distribution of the if-sold value of all
computing equipment (including mainframes and minicomputers) shows the
following distribution of market opportunity:1 5
Market Area %
North America (including Canada and Mexico) 48
Europe (including the U.K.) 37
Far East (including Japan, other Asia, and Australia/New Zealand) 8
Rest of the world 7
Total 100
Desktop computers (including workstations, IBM-PC compatibles, Macintosh
personal computers, and non-compatible personal computers such as the Japanese
NEC products) were only introduced beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s. A
1990 estimate of the installed base of desktop computers in major advanced markets,
which is another way of thinking about market potential for software and peripheral
products, follows: 16
Market Area Million Units %
North America (U.S. and Canada) 67 62
Europe (including the U.K.) 27 25
Japan (NEC platform held 50-70% of installed base) 12 11
Other Asia 2 2
Totals 108 100
As the non-domestic revenues of all of the companies in the sample
essentially consists of exports, another way to look at performance is to consider the
U.S. computer industry's export revenue as a percentage of total revenue, again
15 U.S. Department of Commerce Industry Marketing Statistics, 1985.
1 6 Estimate by Business International, member of The Economist Group, 1990.
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bearing in mind that mainframe and minicomputer equipment are included in the
data.17
Total U.S. factory industry shipments $56 Billion
Exports (not including Canada or Mexico) $24 Billion
Export revenue as % of total 43%
Distribution of Export Revenue from Top Markets %
United Kingdom 13
Germany 12
Belgium/Netherlands 9
France 6
Japan 15
Singapore, Hong Kong 8
Australia 5
All other markets 32
Total 100
The 43% non-domestic revenue level above is relatively high in comparison
to the Inc. and CorpTech data reported earlier. One possibility is that a very small
percentage of the exporters are responsible for much of the export revenue in the
U.S. Commerce sample. An alternate explanation, of course, is that the computer
industry does, in fact, have characteristics that particularly encourage export trade.
Proxy Benchmarks The above data suggest that a small U.S.-based firm that
quickly and consistently achieved 40+% of revenues from outside North America
while still maintaining its overall revenue growth would be globalizing
exceptionally well. Achieving 25-40% non-domestic revenues while maintaining
overall growth might be a more realistic yet healthy goal in some product categories.
Although none of the staff interviewed shared specific market research data, many of
them confirm current internal corporate targets of 35-40% non-domestic revenues,
while the goals of a few extremely aggressive companies are in the range of 50-55%.
Globalization Performance by the Sample Companies 18
On the whole, the sample companies were quite active in global markets.
Within three years following domestic product release, four companies had
developed non-domestic revenues greater than 40% of their totals and an additional
17 U.S. Department of Commerce Industry Marketing Statistics, 1992.
18 Readers interested in more detailed information can obtain from the senior author a series of
benchmark tables -- percentage non-domestic revenues and how quickly they were achieved -- that
specify each numbered company's performance in global markets, as well as the performance of various
demographic subgroups.
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six companies had surpassed 25%. In all, 89% (17) of the companies eventually
developed non-domestic revenues consistently above 10% of their totals; 79% (15) of
the companies exceeded 25%; and 32% (6) managed to cross the 40% non-domestic
revenue threshold.
Company Background Factors Although many of the companies were pulled
into overseas markets fairly early in their history, company performance was heavily
dependent upon management's attention to globalization and dedication of
resources. As expected in our hypothesized integrated model, companies whose
management had expressed early specific interest in ultimately entering overseas
markets were decidedly more effective than those whose management was either
less aware of global opportunity or who purposefully adopted a "U.S. First" strategy.
Ten of the 11 companies that entered global markets via home-based global
managers developed non-domestic revenues greater than 10% of their total within
one year of initiation, in contrast with only 2 out of 8 firms that used less aggressive
entry modes (p=0.003). Three of these 11 companies in fact developed overseas
revenues greater than 25% of their total within the first year; an additional four
reached the 25% benchmark within the second year of activity, and one additional
company shipped more than 25% of product within the second year but saw
somewhat less than 25% revenues realized due to non-parallelism in overseas
versus domestic distribution structures. Fully 8 of these 11 had reached 25% overseas
sales within the first 4 years of domestic product release, versus only 2 of the 8 less
aggressive entrants. (p=0.04)
Even companies that transitioned from passive to active modes simply by
dedicating management resources were able to accelerate greatly the pace of
globalization. Of the eight companies that transitioned from less aggressive modes
of operation, three passed the 10% non-domestic revenue threshold within one year
of transition, and four crossed the 25% level within 2 years.
Only three companies failed to surpass 10% non-domestic revenues while
operating in this mode. Two of them (#3, 10) supply networking hardware that is
subject to country-by-country approval, and thus face the hurdle of expending
engineering (product modification) resources as well as distribution management
resources in order to support entry into new geographic turf. In addition, Company
#10, because of product approval issues, did not even attempt to enter overseas
markets during its first six years of extremely rapid domestic growth, and was already
a $50 million company before any substantial overseas revenues materialized.
Despite the small percentages, however, both companies perceive their incremental
revenues from overseas markets as profitable given the level of resources invested.
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The third company (#6) that failed to surpass the 10% revenue threshold while
operating in this mode had also been handicapped by its U.S.-based growth strategy,
as it had initially begun its overseas activity by ceding responsibility to a third-party
trading partner.
Integrating two sets of managerial factors, we divided the sample into two
clusters: those companies in which the founders both had early intentions of
globalization and who followed up aggressively by adopting the home-based
manager entry mode (9 firms), and all others. All 9 companies with both global
intent and active followup eventually achieved 25% or more global revenues versus
only 7 out the other 10 companies. (p=0.07) 5 of the 9 eventually reached 40% global
revenues in contrast to two of the others. (p=0.11)
Product Group Factors Globalization performance was quite different for the
different product categories, as shown in Figure 3. The networking-related products
Figure 3. Globalization Performance by Product Category.
Overseas Revenue % by Product Group
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on the whole show relatively lower success in global penetration. The current
median non-domestic percentage for regulated networking hardware is only 15%,
and two of these companies are the only sample respondents still under the 10%
mark. The market-by-market approvals required of the regulated hardware were
repeatedly cited as the major barrier to increasing non-domestic revenues in this
group. In addition, this is the only category in which strong local competitors
developed in overseas home markets, and in which low-priced product from Asian
suppliers had an important major market impact.
Only one company (out of seven) in the two advanced networking categories
(unregulated hardware or software) achieved more than 40% non-domestic
revenues. Even the more globally aggressive among advanced networking product
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suppliers were clustered between 20% and 40% non-domestic revenue, with
advanced hardware suppliers able to achieve the 25%+ level fairly quickly (within 2
years) while those advanced software suppliers that did reach 25% did so more
slowly (3-7 years). Three of the companies supplying relatively sophisticated
networking or internetworking products report explicit internal company
expectations of 28-35% non-domestic revenues as being an appropriate equilibrium
state.
This lower degree of globalization by this group of companies seems consistent
with a diffusion lag in the less-mature overseas markets alluded to by several
respondents: the advanced networking hardware backbone is first installed for basic
connectivity, and then more sophisticated software is required as consumers become
more familiar with highly networked operations. U.S.-based customers with
overseas subsidiaries, while not necessarily the initial source of globalization, were
nevertheless mentioned several times as important in introducing these more
advanced networking technologies into overseas markets.
The apparent lower degree of maturity in overseas markets did not, however,
affect the global nature of the advanced networking product competition. All of
these three companies (each serving different product segments) feel themselves to
be in worldwide head-to-head competition with one or two other U.S.-based
suppliers, and have quite good information on both their own worldwide
marketshares and on their competitors' non-domestic revenue levels.
Two software product categories-Programming Tools and
Technical/Engineering-show relatively high degrees of globalization, as 63% of the
companies in the two groups combined achieved the 40% level, while 88% are above
the 25% level. The median company in these two categories combined currently
derives 35% of revenue from overseas markets, well above the 25% median for the
entire sample.
With the exception of the specialized text database supplier (#4), all companies
in these two categories feel that they are engaged in global competition with one or
several other major players, each of which is present in most major markets.
Interestingly, Technical/Engineering Software is the only category to report the
strong major-market presence of products from non-U.S. (specifically French)
suppliers.
Distribution Business Model Factors Globalization seems related to how
quickly and effectively a company is able to create an overseas distribution structure
that approximates its domestic business mode. VAR-channel companies seem to
globalize more quickly than the two direct groups (p=0.07), reflecting the fact that a
company structured to support domestic VAR channels is equally well-structured to
22
__
support the early overseas VAR channels with which they come into contact
without expending too much incremental effort.
The Direct Field Sales model, in contrast, requires intimate contact between
highly trained technical sales people and informed end-users, and the primary
partner distributors initially engaged represent both a communications buffer and a
reduction in net revenue. The Direct Field Sales companies required allocation of a
larger proportion of internal resources in order to attack overseas markets effectively
by replacing the buffer layer, and thus took longer to ramp up.
A compelling illustration of how important matching the business model was
to globalization success is found in a comparison of two companies within the same
distribution group:
· Company #15 sells highly complex and novel Technical Engineering
Software via domestic Direct Field Sales. It hired its first international
business development manager in advance of domestic product release. He
was given the charter of building the overseas business base, initially via
distributors, but also by personally visiting key overseas end users to facilitate
going direct as soon as possible. This company achieved 20% non-domestic
revenues within 1 year, 30+% in the second, 40+% in the third, and
equilibrated at 35-40% non-domestic revenues (achieved through an ever-
expanding investment in overseas field sales offices) while maintaining its
overall explosive company growth.
· Company #6 sells highly complex Network System Software, also
largely via a domestic Direct Field Sales force. It initially gave globalization
responsibility to a third party trading house, and only dedicated an internal
manager of global business development after five years of neglect. By that
time, of course, growth in non-domestic revenues trailed domestic growth by
a great margin, and it took three more years to build non-domestic revenues
to 10% of the total. This company's only major rival (not in the sample), in
contrast, established itself aggressively and effectively in overseas markets, and
continues to enjoy both high overseas market share and a high non-domestic
revenue percentage despite the fact that its product is substantially behind that
of Company #6 in the U.S. market.
Similar contrasts were found within the other three distribution groups, with
company globalization success being intimately linked to how effectively a company
was able to approximate its domestic business model in key overseas markets.
Discussion and Conclusions
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The globalization performance of the companies in the sample suggests that
small companies supplying desktop computing products both can and do globalize
more rapidly and compete more effectively in global markets than is predicted by the
traditional models of global expansion. 21% of the sample companies currently
derive more than 40% of revenue from overseas markets. 47% are in the 25-40%
band, while 21% are between 10-25% and only 11% have not yet achieved 10% non-
domestic revenues.
Vernon's Product Cycle Model
The sample companies represent five major product groups. With the
exception of the regulated networking hardware products, U.S.-based companies
dominate these product segments in every major global market, a state reminiscent
of the post-war era for which Vernon's Product Cycle model provides an effective
description of the transfer of U.S.-developed innovation to global markets. The
globalization experiences of the advanced networking product suppliers, which
indicate a definite time-lag between market acceptance in Europe and market
acceptance in Japan, provide limited support for a product cycle explanation of
overseas market development or technical product diffusion.
A core assumption of the product cycle model, however, largely not reflected
in the behavior of sample companies, addresses the eventual transfer of production
to overseas markets, and the subsequent importation of overseas-produced goods for
domestic consumption. Only two of the sample companies (both networking
hardware suppliers) have yet set up true overseas production facilities, from which
they coordinate supply to all (not just U.S.) markets. The only software companies to
enter into overseas production (in the form of republishing) did so specifically to
tailor local language and features, and do not have any use for the foreign-produced
product in domestic markets.
Most of the other companies, even those that produce language- or feature-
localized products, do so from their U.S. base, and expect to continue doing so. One
company indicates that it is considering establishing a European design staff to aid in
developing pan-European products and to absorb specialized market knowledge on
European usage of ISDN telecommunications technology. But its production of such
European-specific products will still be centralized at the U.S. home base.
Thus "traces of the product cycle model" can in fact be seen in the
globalization by the sample companies, as Vernon had expected. But the nature of
the goods supplied by these companies, combined with the relatively low percentage
of cost represented by transportation, seems to have greatly mitigated the impetus to
transfer production activities, and thus much of the product cycle model's
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explanatory power. Perhaps it is still too soon in the life cycles of most of the sample
firms for overseas production to occur.
Rugman's Internationalization Process
Each of the emerging firms selected for this study was organized specifically to
create and appropriate technological and product advantage. Consequently they
might well avoid the initial licensing step suggested by Rugman et al. (see Figure 1),
but otherwise could reasonably be imagined to fit the Internationalization pattern.
Yet the globalization behavior of the sample companies is also at odds with what
would be expected under Rugman's model.
Where he suggests companies would proceed slowly into overseas markets,
most companies in the sample were active within two years-many pulled by eager
overseas partners. Where he suggests a cautious, incremental deepening of
involvement based upon initially relying on outside experts and then slowly
acquiring internal market familiarity, more than 50% of the sample companies began
their global activities in what has been described as operating Mode C (dedicated
home-based resources), and six of the companies were operating in Mode D (local
overseas distribution staff) within four years of initial domestic product release.
In fact, the experiences of the sample companies clearly suggest that the more
quickly and aggressively companies internalize their global distribution activities to a
structure approximating their successful domestic models, the higher the rewards.
At the same time, the global nature of the desktop computing environment means
that too much caution might actually expose a company to an substantial late-mover
opportunity cost risk in overseas markets.
The three companies that followed Rugman's cautious, incremental model by
initially placing their overseas development activities in the hands of outside experts
suffered poor global returns. All of the companies that either entered late or in a
mode poorly matched to their domestic structure both lag their product-group
counterparts in the sample, and know of more aggressive U.S.-based direct
competitors that are consistently achieving a higher percentage of revenues from
overseas markets even if their core products trail those of the sample companies in
the U.S. market.
The Integrated Globalization Model
The sections on Globalization Patterns and Globalization Performance
communicated many external forces that molded the non-domestic revenue market
opportunities. Most significant were the positive effects of the desktop computing
platforms and the negative effects of regulatory factors in some markets. In
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particular the existence of standardized global operating platforms has both
accelerated the timing of overseas exposure and mitigated many of the risks Rugman
emphasizes as associated with overseas market expansion.
Accelerated Overseas Exposure Nearly all of the sample companies report
extremely early (within 2 years of product release) contact with overseas customers or
distribution partners. While part of the early contact may be the result simply of the
generally improved global communications infrastructure and reductions in transit
and travel costs, the desktop computing industry trade shows and trade journals that
concentrate on specific platform environments particularly facilitate the mutual
discovery of early market opportunity. Thus, with the exception of regulated
products, companies tend to be forced into making active sell/no-sell decisions quite
early in their histories.
Reduced Market Information Risks At the same time, supplying products that
operate within a standard platform seems to reduce the market information risk
traditionally associated with small companies moving into overseas markets. A
company supplying a Macintosh- or Sun-compatible product can think of its
customers as platform-users first and overseas-"different"-users second. Companies
(except for regulated hardware suppliers) successfully entered most overseas markets
with domestic versions of their products, and only moved towards localized market
tailoring to deepen market penetration and/or to raise the entry cost for new
competitors. The knowledge of domestic-based third-party trading experts thus
became inherently less valuable for platform-compatible goods, and, as an additional
boundary layer between supplier and customer, third-party traders actually retarded
globalization.
The fact that platforms exist, however, does not entirely eliminate market
information risk, as can be seen in the experience of both the regulated hardware
suppliers and the advanced networking system product suppliers. In the case of the
regulated hardware group, market-by-market regulatory approvals require
substantial investment in local information regarding both standards and approval
processes, as well as product modification engineering expenses. In the case of
advanced networking system product suppliers, knowledge about the specific
development or maturity of individual overseas markets is needed in order to
evaluate expansion potential. Because of the highly integrated nature of platform-
specific products, and the fact that the platforms are predominantly supplied by U.S.-
based companies, even suppliers of advanced networking products can acquire
relevant overseas market information by contacting domestic industry (not trading)
resources. Several of the respondents indicate that their expansion programs had
been tailored specifically in response to feedback that they had solicited from the
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U.S.-based platform suppliers (e.g. Apple, Sun, Novell) with which their products
operate.
Reduced Distribution Partner Investment Risks The development of
standardized platforms also has encouraged the growth of technically competent
overseas local distributors, and mitigated some of their own risk in investing in
relatively high levels of sales and trained technical staff. The penetration of a
platform into a local market is quickly followed by a host of software and peripheral
products, so that even if the main platform suppliers had wholly-owned local
channels, there is plenty of opportunity for independent distributors to collect a large
portfolio of compatible products. By holding a portfolio of products that all rely on
the same operating systems and connections, these distribution companies can
justify investing in a more robust total staff than in the more classic trading company
distribution situation in which each product in the company's portfolio requires a
unique set of sales and support skills. At the same time, companies holding a
portfolio of platform-related products can also afford to take on distribution for the
new product offering of the small startup companies typically innovating in this
market. Incremental staff investment is low, and thus the financial risks associated
with supplier failure are small.
These well-staffed, specialized distributors in each major market typically
became the initial "primary partner" for the sample companies. Because the primary
partners could invest in a relatively robust staff, they were also able to provide
additional marketing coordination and sales support for companies not yet ready to
invest in overseas staff. Even small U.S.-based companies were able to contract for
these services through the granting of additional discount levels, and thus exert a
more direct influence over their overseas performance. As shown previously,
however, the need to create an overseas business model approximating the domestic
model dictates how long a company might rely upon arms-length regional
coordination before internalizing these functions through overseas direct staff.
Managerial Readiness and Assertiveness The statistical analyses demonstrate
that the primary differences among companies in their globalization success were
due to management factors. Founder international experiences and sensitivity
provided critical underpinning for global programs. Senior management
willingness to commit resourcess to non-domestic markets display significant
consequences. More aggressive modes of foreign market entry pay off dramatically.
Combining these managerial characteristics leads to eventual global market
participation rates far in excess of companies with less integrated international intent
and commitment.
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Summary
This study of 19 Massachusetts-based companies has shown that unique
aspects of one emerging high-technology industry, desktop platform-based computer
hardware and software products, result in a vastly accelerated globalization pattern-
not deterministically leading towards overseas production activities-that is
inconsistent with traditional expansion models. These unique features include:
goods with extremely high value-to-transportation-costs; rapid supplier exposure to
overseas markets; lowered market-familiarity information risk on the part of
emerging suppliers; and the development of easy access to well-qualified distribution
partners in major overseas markets. The authors' alternative integrated model,
building upon both Vernon and Rugman, shows far better explanatory power than
the traditional approaches.
The study was, of course, conducted on a small, non-random sample, and was
primarily concerned with exploring globalization behavior in order to identify
patterns and trends. Clearly there is opportunity to follow up by designing a more
statistically robust sample-stratified by industry groupings and by geographic
region-in order to conduct a more extensive and rigorous analysis of globalization
in emerging high-technology industries.
In addition, only very gross measures of globalization were utilized here, and
no attempt was made to link a company's rapid development of high percentages of
non-domestic revenues with other measures of success, such as overall growth,
overall profitability, or stock market performance.
The managerial implications for emerging companies are nevertheless
compelling, however, as globalization behavior has clearly become an ever more
important component of emerging company performance. Even tiny suppliers of
platform-based products were able to globalize quickly and effectively, primarily by
allocating a moderate level of highly-leveraged internal resources. Furthermore,
companies that did not respond effectively to their initial exposure to overseas
markets risked falling behind their more globally aggressive competitors.
At the same time, each company determining its globalization strategy must
consider, within the context of its own business model and product/market space,
the ultimate level of resources dedicated to support overseas expansion, the level of
internalization of global activity, and the expected equilibrium levels of overseas
revenues.
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Appendix: The Sample Companies
The sample companies were selected specifically to have been founded or
reborn around products aimed at the workstation or personal computing markets.
Table 1 lists the companies in order of the U.S. release date of the first core product
(terms are defined in the sections that follow):
Table 1. Principal Characteristics of the Desktop Computing Sample.
Date of Initl
ID# Startup USRel
1 1980 1982
2 69 83
3 84 84
4 84 84
5 83 85
6 83 85
7 82 85
8 84 85
9 86 86
10 77 87
11 85 87
12 86 88
13 87 88
14 86 88
15 85 88
16 89 89
17 74 91
18 82 92
19 91 92
Source of
Funds
VC
Consulting
Private
Consulting
VC
VC
VC
Private
Private
VC/Rebirth
Private
VC
VC
VC
VC
Private
Priv/Rebirth
Priv/Rebirth
Private
Hardware or
Software
HW
SW
HW
SW
HW
SW(HW)
SW
SW
SW
HW
HW
HW
HW
SW
SW
HW
SW
SW
SW
End-Use
Product Category
Comm/NW(R)
Programming Tool
Comm/NW(R)
ProgTool(Special)
Comm/NW
Comm/NW
Programming Tool
Tech/Engineering
Comm/NW
Comm/NW(R)
Comm/NW(R)
Comm/NW
Comm/NW
Programming Tool
Tech/Engineering
Comm/NW
Programming Tool
Comm/NW
Tech/Engineering
Primary Comp.
Platform
PC
WS
PC
PC
IN
PC/IN
WS
WS/PC/MAC
PC
PC
MAC
IN
MAC/IN
WS
WS
WS(Sun)
WS
PC(Novell)
WS/PC
Prim. Domestic
Dist. Channel
VAR
Direct FieldSls
DirectTel(VAR)
VAR
VAR(OEM)
DirFS(VAR)
DirFS
DirTelesales
DirFS
Distrib(OEM)
Distributor
VAR
DirTel(Dist)
DirectFS
DirectFS
VAR(Dist)
DirectFS
VAR
DirTel
Funding Backgrounds. Nine of the 19 companies received funding from
professional venture capital (VC) firms prior to or concurrent with domestic product
release, while the rest were funded by the founders and other private investors. Two
of the companies developed and launched commercial products from a consulting
business base. Three of the companies had been reborn around new core products
after exiting prior product lines.
Product Categories. The eight hardware and 11 software products initially
introduced by the sample companies fall broadly into three categories:
Communications/Networking Products (11); Programming/Software Development
Tools used by professional programmers (5); and Technical/Engineering Software
Tools used by professional engineers (3).
The 11 products aimed at Communications/Networking applications may
further be classified by the nature of their interface with the target country's
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telecommunications infrastructure. Four of these hardware products directly plug
into telephone lines (e.g. modems), and thus are subject to regulatory approval by
federal communications authorities (tagged "R" in Table 1). The four other
hardware products and the three primarily software products are not subject to any
approvals.
Thus, from Table 1, the overall sample consists of five product groups:
N Product Category Company ID #
4 HW for Comm/NW-Regulated 1,3,10,11
4 HW for Comm/NW-Unregulated 5,12,13,16
3 SW for Comm/NW 6,9,18
5 SW for Programming/Development 2,4,7,14,17
3 SW for Technical/Engineering Applications 8,15,19
Primary Computer Platforms. Desktop computing encompasses a number of
platforms or operating environments. Nine of the products operate on IBM-
compatible personal computers (PC). Three products are for Macintosh computers
(MAC). Nine products are aimed at workstations (WS). Four products were
specifically designed to aid in interconnecting networks of various computers (IN).
The categories overlap somewhat, as several of the products were released for
multiple computing platforms.
Domestic Distribution Channels. As indicated in Table 1, the domestic
distribution channels used represent a wide mix of distribution models.
Direct Field Sales Direct Field Sales describes a sales force, employed by the
manufacturer, that routinely visits potential customers to make on-site
presentations and meet with the various customer buying influencers. The sample
companies that invested in developing a domestic Direct Field Sales force (#2, 6, 7, 9,
14, 15, 17) tended to be selling products that were rather expensive, that created new
product categories or pioneering applications, and/or had high strategic importance
or organizational impact for the end-user. Seven of the 11 software products were
sold predominantly via a domestic Direct Field Sales force. No hardware product in
this sample was sold via Direct Field Sales.
Direct Telesales In Direct Telephone Sales an employee of the manufacturer
delivers his/her sales pitch via a phone call from the home office. It is a less onerous
investment in wholly-owned sales resources, but nevertheless allows the
manufacturer to retain complete control of both demand generation and customer
contact. Domestic Direct Telesales (companies #3, 8, 13, 19) were generally employed
for products with well-defined functional bounds--not requiring major
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organizational or cross-functional coordination at the customer site-but which
were sold on the basis of complex technical performance, and thus required deep
product familiarity and expertise on the part of the salesperson. Two of the three
Technical/Engineering software products relied domestically on Direct Telesales, as
did two of the hardware products.
The Value-Added Reseller Channel Value-added Resellers (VAR) are third-
party companies that specialize in combining technical products from different
manufacturers with their own product offerings and providing customers with an
integrated turnkey solution. Utilization of the VAR channel thus means that the
manufacturer has invested fewer resources in the sale and has ceded substantial
ownership and control of the customer relationship to the VAR partner.
VAR channels were typically utilized by the sample companies when
applications for their products were fragmented into many specialized niches that
require specific expertise, particularly in configuration and installation. Two of the
software companies in the sample depended primarily upon domestic VAR
channels (#4, 18), while two other software companies supplemented their Direct
Field Sales with application-specific or market-specific VAR partners. Four of the
hardware suppliers concentrated on VAR channels (#1, 5, 12, 16).
Distributors The large national distributors, which resell both to large end-
users and to dealers and retail channels, represent an even larger separating layer
between the manufacturer and the customer. Distributors were the primary
domestic channels utilized by two hardware companies (#10, 11), each of which
supplied well-defined, relatively lower-price products that were sold primarily on
the basis of features and specifications.
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) Channels Supplying a large
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) partner with a product completely
separates the manufacturer from the product-using market by replacing the
manufacturer's brand with the partner's, and employing the partner's sales
channels. Three of the hardware manufacturers in the sample had important
domestic OEM partnering arrangements at various stages, but OEM revenue did not
consistently represent more than 30% of any company's revenues.
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